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ABSTRACT 
 
Implicit or non-conscious cognition is traditionally assumed to be robust to pathology 
but Gomez-Beldarrain et al (1999, 2002) recently showed deficits on a single implicit 
task after head injury. Laboratory research suggests that implicit processes dissociate. 
This study therefore examined implicit cognition in 20 head-injured patients and age- 
and I.Q.-matched controls using a battery of four implicit cognition tasks: a Serial 
Reaction Time task (SRT), mere exposure effect task, automatic stereotype activation 
and hidden co-variation detection. Patients were assessed on an extensive 
neuropsychological battery, and MRI scanned. Inclusion criteria included impairment 
on at least one measure of executive function. The patient group was impaired relative 
to the control group on all the implicit cognition tasks except automatic stereotype 
activation. Effect size analyses using the control mean and standard deviation for 
reference showed further dissociations across patients and across implicit tasks. 
Patients impaired on implicit tasks had more cognitive deficits overall than those 
unimpaired, and a larger Dysexecutive Self/Other discrepancy (DEX) score 
suggesting greater behavioural problems. Performance on the SRT task correlated 
with a composite measure of executive function. Head-injury thus produced 
heterogeneous impairments in the implicit acquisition of new information. Implicit 
activation of existing knowledge structures appeared intact. Impairments in implicit 
cognition and executive function may interact to produce dysfunctional behaviour 
after head-injury. Future comparisons of implicit and explicit cognition should use 
several measures of each function, to ensure that they measure the latent variable of 
interest.  
Keywords:  Executive, social cognition, non-conscious processes, fractionated, head 
injury 
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INTRODUCTION 
Implicit cognition is the acquisition of knowledge that subsequently influences 
behaviour without explicit awareness of the knowledge acquired (automatic, low-
level perceptual processes are not included under this rubric). Historically, implicit 
cognition has been thought to be robust to neuropathology (Reber, 1989), although 
Parkinson’s disease patients have been shown to be impaired on tasks of implicit 
cognition (Knowlton, Mangels & Squire, 1996). Recent evidence suggests that 
frontally injured patients are impaired on a Serial Reaction Time (SRT) task of 
implicit learning, amongst other cognitive deficits (Gomez-Beldarrain, Grafman, 
Pascual-Leone & Garcia-Monco, 1999; Gomez-Beldarrain, Grafman, de Valesco, 
Pascual-Leone & Garcia-Monco, 2002). The current paper presents a comprehensive 
assessment of implicit cognition in patients with head injury, disordered social 
behaviour and executive dysfunction and explores the relationship between implicit 
cognition and executive function indicated by our results.  
Head injury may result in an array of cognitive, emotional and behavioural deficits 
that are often theorised as a result of executive dysfunction particularly where frontal 
pathology is known or suspected (Baddeley & Wilson, 1988). Executive functions are 
defined as super-ordinate mechanisms or (top-down) processes that operate on, 
integrate, inhibit or update lower cognitive processes (Miyake et al, 2000). Gomez-
Beldarrain et al’s (1999; 2001) findings of diminished implicit performance in a 
frontal group, indicate that implicit or bottom-up (stimulus driven) processes might 
also be adversely affected by pathology, not as a result of, but distinct from, executive 
functions, since implicit cognition makes minimal demands upon controlled attention 
(Jiménéz, & Méndez, 2001), and can be impaired when executive functions remain 
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intact (Barker, Andrade & Romanowski, 2004). The inverse pattern, impaired 
executive function with intact implicit cognition has been shown in Parkinson’s 
disease patients (Witt, Nühsman & Deuschl, 2002). Evidence of double dissociation 
between implicit processes and high level control or executive processes strengthens 
the assumption that these processes function independently and may be selectively 
affected by pathology. However, with the exception of our own case study (Barker et 
al, 2004), previous studies of implicit cognition with neuropathological groups have 
usually employed only one, and seldom more than two measures of implicit 
cognition. In the PD literature, implicit tasks usually consist of a Serial Reaction Time 
task and Pursuit Rotor Tracking task or the Tower of Hanoi with the latter two 
arguably classified as implicit learning tasks. Consequently, there is a risk that results 
reflect peculiarities of the chosen tasks that are peripheral to the implicit cognition 
component, rather than reflecting implicit cognitive ability. 
The present study tested the performance of head injured patients and matched 
controls on a battery of four implicit cognition tasks. Patients presented clinically with 
frontal type symptoms and negative post-morbid socio-behavioural changes that 
varied from mild to severe. We measured IQ, executive function, memory and mood 
state to establish patterns of impairment and sparing on implicit and explicit tasks. 
Where possible, MRI scans were conducted to establish size and location of 
pathology. 
Implicit tasks were selected according to the framework proposed by Lieberman 
(2000) that distinguishes between measures of implicit judgment and implicit 
performance. Seger (1997) similarly distinguished different ‘types’ of implicit 
cognition. Lieberman’s (2000) distinction is particularly pertinent to head-injured 
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patients with socio-behavioral problems because he proposed that the two types of 
implicit cognition map onto different aspects of behavior. Implicit judgement 
underpins ability to detect subtle nonverbal aspects of behaviour (including 
metalinguistic components of speech) that provide information about others’ mood 
state, personality and intentions, whereas implicit performance enables a nonverbal 
response to these cues to be orchestrated and behaviourally expressed. Lieberman’s 
(2000) hypothesis provides a catalyst for reframing implicit cognition as comprising 
important pre-conscious processes that interact with or subserve other cognitive 
processes to promote adaptive behaviour. This is a new departure for research 
concerned with implicit processes, which has traditionally focused on isolating 
implicit processes in the laboratory with most researchers remaining mute as to the 
‘real world’ function of these processes or their interactions with explicit processes. 
We chose two tasks of implicit performance, a Serial Reaction Time task (SRT, 
Nissen & Bullemer, 1987) and an automatic stereotype activation task (ASA, Bargh, 
Chen & Burrows, 1996), and two of implicit judgement, the mere exposure effect 
(MEE, Zajonc, 1980) and a hidden co-variation detection (HCD, Lewicki, 1986) task, 
for the present study. One task in each category manipulated socially meaningful 
stimuli (elderly stereotype words in the ASA task and female faces in the HCD task) 
as the crucial variables. This set of tasks enabled us to test the ability of head-injured 
patients on implicit judgement as well as implicit performance tasks and whether 
performance is affected by the use of socially-relevant stimuli. As with any measure, 
these tasks are not process pure, performance may be influenced by explicit as well as 
implicit processes. Nonetheless, previous research indicates that performance on these 
tasks is relatively independent of explicit processing: for example, participants with 
amnesia showed learning on the SRT task despite lack of explicit knowledge of the 
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sequence (Nissen, Willingham & Hartman, 1989). We assessed explicit knowledge 
contributions to the tasks and included other measures of cognitive function to help 
delineate the ways in which implicit cognition might contribute to or interact with 
higher cognitive processes (executive function, IQ, explicit and working memory). 
 
METHOD 
All head-injured participants gave informed consent before taking part in the study. 
Ethical approval was sought from Sheffield South and North and Barnsley and 
Doncaster NHS Research Committees. Twenty head injured patients (19 male and 
one female) were matched to twenty controls for age and IQ. Wherever possible 
spouses or significant others were recruited as controls as we thought it more 
important to match for demography than gender. Patients were referred (by N. Morton 
and A. Wasti) on the basis that they presented with varying levels of post-morbid 
socio-behavioural and emotional problems usually ascribed to frontal injury and 
executive-type deficits. Inclusion criteria specified that patients showed impaired 
performance on at least one executive function subtest during neuropsychological 
testing. Patients were MRI scanned unless there were medical or behavioural 
contraindications (e.g. metal aneurysm clips, violent behavior). Patients with a history 
of alcoholism, depression, or drug addiction were not included in the study. Patients 
were aged between 18 and 65 and at least two years post-injury at time of testing.  
 
All participants completed four tasks of implicit cognition in randomly assigned order 
with the only caveat that a short task should always follow a longer task. Both groups 
completed a full assessment of IQ on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III 
(WAIS-III, Wechsler, 1997), Verbal Fluency (Controlled Oral Word Association Test 
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– FAS version: Benton, 1989) and the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HAD). 
The patient group were administered the Wechsler Memory Scale-R (WMS-R, 
Wechsler, 1987), National Adult Reading Test (NART, Nelson; 1991), and four tests 
of executive function: Hayling and Brixton (Burgess & Shallice, 1997), Behavioural 
Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome (BADS, Wilson, Alderman, Burgess, 
Emslie & Evans, 1996), and the Wisconsin Card Sort Task (WCST, Heaton, 1981).  
Implicit cognitive tasks 
Serial Reaction Time task 
This task was programmed in Psyscope (Cohen, MacWhinney, Flatt & Provost, 1993) 
and presented on a Macintosh Powerbook 5300. Participants completed a practice 
session before beginning the task. At acquisition, participants responded as quickly as 
possible to a target appearing in a predetermined 10 trial sequence, A B C D B C B D 
B C, by pressing the corresponding key (v, b, n or m). The target was a 1cm diameter 
closed white circle on a black background, which on any given trial appeared in one 
of four locations evenly spaced in a row. Participants were randomly assigned to one 
of two screen assignments (see Seger, 1997), to counterbalance the frequency with 
which the outer and inner locations were used. Circles disappeared when the 
appropriate key press was made. The response-stimulus interval was 200 msec. 
 
Stimuli were presented in six acquisition blocks of 50 trials (five sequence 
repetitions) with rest breaks between each block, followed by a test block of 50 trials. 
There were also three random blocks, one at the beginning of the acquisition phase to 
confound any automatic judgement by participants that circles might appear in a 
pattern, and two flanking the sequence block at test. The test phase, of two random 
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and one sequence block, followed immediately after the acquisition phase and without 
warning to participants. For the random block trials the target locations were hard 
wired into the programme in a pseudo-random order to ensure that performance 
differences between sequence and random blocks at test did not result from mere 
learning of first order frequency information. The random blocks matched the 
sequence blocks for frequency of the different locations and the fact that locations 
were not used twice in succession and consecutively ordered and familiar patterns 
(4321 and 1234) did not occur.  
After the task participants completed an explicit knowledge questionnaire (Seger, 
1997). They were informed that circles followed a sequence and rated how certain 
they were of the presence of a pattern, described any pattern that they had noticed, 
then rated (overleaf) how sure they were that the sequence consisted of a) ten 
positions (correct) and b) 12 or more positions. 
 
Task scores  
We used Seger's (1997) scoring method for the explicit task and her criterion that a 
score of sixteen or over showed explicit knowledge of the sequence. Each of the three 
test blocks (two random and one sequence block) produced 50 reaction time values, 
divisible as five repeats of ten trials. We calculated the median RTs for each of the 
five repeats of ten trials. The five medians for each block were combined to produce 
three means, one sequence mean and one mean for each random block. The two 
random block means were combined to produce a single mean. The sequence mean 
was subtracted from the random mean to provide a single learning score for each 
participant.  
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Mere exposure effect task 
Participants listened to one of two lists of fifteen disyllabic Finnish words, matched 
for likeability, recorded on compact disc and presented audibly (see Andrade, Englert, 
Harper and Edwards, 2001). The word list was presented twice, at a rate of one word 
per 1.5 seconds. Use of word lists as targets or foils was counterbalanced across 
participants. After the acquisition phase, the C.O.W.A. (Controlled Oral Word 
Association Test – FAS version - Benton, 1989) was administered for three minutes, 
serving as a distractor and measure of the executive function of strategy/response 
initiation. Participants then heard a test list containing all 30 words, targets and foils, 
recorded in random order with a 4 second inter-stimulus interval. For the preference 
task, participants were asked to guess whether the words meant something good or 
something bad on the basis of their sound, rating each word as "very nice/good", 
"slightly nice/good", "slightly nasty/bad" or "very nasty/bad". The aim of this 
instruction was to imply that there was a correct answer on each trial to discourage 
participants from making a global judgement about the sound of Finnish words and 
consequently rate each word identically (see Murphy & Zajonc, 1993). The mere 
exposure effect is shown by preference for previously presented words relative to the 
foils. Participants then rated their recognition for each word as "definitely remember", 
"seems familiar", "seems unfamiliar", or "definitely do not remember". However, the 
recognition results are confounded by the preference condition always coming first 
(as implicit cognition was the main focus) and are not reported further.  
 
Task scores   
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Response sheets were scored as follows: three points for "very nice", two points for 
"slightly nice", one point for "slightly nasty", and 0 points for "very nasty".  
Individual preference priming scores were calculated by subtracting the sum of 
preference ratings for foil words from the sum of preference ratings for target words. 
A score of zero indicated that priming did not take place whilst a positive value 
indicated that previously exposed words were preferred to new words.  
Hidden co-variation detection (HCD) task 
 
This task was programmed in Psyscope (Cohen et al, 1993) and presented on a 
Macintosh Powerbook 5300. At the beginning of the task, participants were told that 
stimulus persons were real and were chosen as remarkable, and especially positive in 
some way. At acquisition they viewed six faces, selected in counter-balanced fashion 
from a pool of ten. Each face was presented for 15 seconds, with a 2.5 seconds blank 
interval between presentations. Each face was accompanied by an auditory 
personality description that lasted for 17 seconds so participants could not observe the 
faces without hearing the description. The personality descriptions implied, but did 
not overtly state, that the person was either capable or kind. Personality co-varied 
with hair length such that long hair=kind personality and short hair=capable 
personality, or short hair=kind, long hair=capable. The alternate co-variations served 
as foils at test. Co-variation presentation, order of stimulus faces and order of auditory 
personality description files were counterbalanced across four groups, to which 
participants were randomly assigned. 
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Three of the six stimulus faces had long and three had short hair and they were 
presented such that hair length alternated. Hair colour was calibrated to the same 
shade in Adobe Photoshop and graphically manipulated so that each face had both 
long and short hair (above shoulders) versions. Hair length varied in degree of long or 
shortness so that the co-variation between hair length and personality trait remained 
non-salient. Faces were adjusted in Photoshop to be smiling and morphologically 
similar (softer jaw line, smaller nose, similar hair colour). Adjusted faces did not 
differ significantly on pilot ratings of attractiveness, capability and kindness. The 
acquisition phase was followed by a visual distractor task. Participants had to count 
how many of 36 presented words began with the letter ‘S’ and select one of three 
possible answers at the end of the task. 
 
At test, participants saw two presentations of four new faces, accompanied once by 
the question ‘kind?’ and once by ‘capable?, printed in bold beneath the face. The two 
presentations of each face were separated by 2-4 presentations of other faces. 
Presentation of the test stimulus ended when participants pressed either ‘Y’ (yes) or 
‘N’ (no) on the keypad, and was followed by a blank screen for three seconds. 
Participants were asked not to think about their response too deeply but to respond on 
the basis of their first impressions of the stimulus face. Faster responses to the primed 
associations between personality and hair length indicated implicit detection of that 
co-variation (Barker & Andrade, in press). 
For the explicit measure, participants were asked whether they based their judgements 
at test on a visual aspect of the person and, if ‘yes’, which aspect? (Lewicki, 1986). 
 Task scores   
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The test phase produced four reaction times to primed hair/trait co-variances and four 
to non-primed co-variances, for each participant. Reaction time values were combined 
to provide a single prime and foil mean for each participant.  
 
Automatic stereotype activation task 
In Bargh et al’s (1996) ASA task, participants exposed to elderly prime words 
embedded in scrambled sentences walked away from the laboratory more slowly than 
those exposed to neutral words, despite reporting no awareness of the primes. The 
present study measured motor speed on a simple paper-and-pencil task in a within-
subjects design. Participants began by practising the motor task, an adaptation of the 
Trails A version of the Trail Making Test (Lezak, 1995). The task had a right/wrong 
component to prevent participants assuming that they needed to make speedy 
responses and thereby confounding any effects of the prime. The task comprised 12 
sheets of A4 paper containing 20 circles numbered 1-20 distributed randomly over the 
page. Each sheet was different and the order randomised for each participant. 
Participants were asked to join up the circles in order from 1-20 and to concentrate on 
accuracy rather than speed. Participants completed two sheets for the practice, to 
minimise the amount of speeding up due to practise between the first and second 
motor tasks.  
Next, participants were presented with thirty scrambled sentences consisting of five 
words each in the prime condition and in the neutral condition. They were instructed 
to make meaningful and grammatical sentences using only four of the five words. For 
example, ‘flew eagle the plane around’ could become ‘the eagle flew around’. The 
prime condition consisted of 28 sentences containing one word each relating to the 
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‘elderly’ stereotype (e.g., ancient, wrinkle, bingo, grey) and two neutral sentences. 
The thirty scrambled sentences in the neutral condition contained no reference to the 
elderly stereotype. 
After completing the first set of sentences, participants attempted five sheets of the 
motor task. They were surreptitiously timed and told to stop after 60 seconds. Next, 
they were asked to count backwards from 60 to 0 without making mistakes. The 
second scrambled sentence condition then began, followed by the last set of five 
motor task sheets for a time limit of 60 seconds.  
The explicit measure consisted of the funnel debriefing approach used by Bargh et al 
(1996) beginning with general questions (“What do you think the purpose of the 
experiment was?”) and becoming more specific (“Did you notice any particular 
pattern or theme to the words used in the sentences?”). 
Task scores 
The number of circles conjoined on each motor task (prime and neutral) by each 
participant constituted the dependent measure. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Controls were well matched with patients for age (control mean 34.1 years, SD 12.2, 
patient mean 32.9 years, SD 12.1), years of education (control mean 12.0, SD 1.7, 
patient mean 11.8, SD 1.9) and IQ (full scale IQ: control mean 99.9, SD 11.7, patient 
mean 98.2, SD 11.9). Estimates of pre-morbid IQ from the NART showed negligible 
decline in patients’ IQ post-injury (mean NART 99.4, SD 13.1, F< 1). 
Brain imaging data 
 
Table 1 presents the imaging data for patients who were MRI scanned or had previous 
CT scans (one case) that we could access. Lesion data were quantified on the basis of 
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Brodmann’s regions but for ease of comparison are presented here under the general 
heading of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (including Brodmann’s areas 8, 9, 46), 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (including Brodmann’s areas 11, 12, 13, 14, 47) and/or 
additional frontal or other brain regions.  
Table 1. Pathology to ventromedial prefrontal cortices (VMPFC), dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and other brain regions for scanned patients 
 
 
Case RIGHT 
VMPFC 
RIGHT 
DLPFC 
LEFT  
VMPFC 
LEFT  
DLPFC 
Additional frontal and other 
brain regions 
 
Case 1 
 
 
BA (47) 
 
BA (8) 
 
BA (47) 
  
Bilateral temporal gyrus 
Case 2     Middle temporal gyrus 
Inferior temporal gyrus 
Case 3 BA (10), (11), 
(12), (13), (14). 
(47) 
BA (46), 
(45) 
BA (10), 
(11), (12), 
(13), (14). 
(47) 
(BA) 45 Temporal Pole Right and Left 
Case 4 
 
 BA (8), (9)  BA (8), (9), 
(46) 
 
 
Case 5 
 
 
 
BA (10), (11), 
(12), (13), (47) 
 
BA (8), (9) 
  
BA (8) 
 
Left middle temporal gyri, right 
temporal lobe BA (44), (45) 
Case 6     Focal lesion to Centrum 
Semiovale 
Case 7 
 
Acollosal  Acollosal   
Case 8 
 
Region not 
specified 
 Region not 
specified 
  
Case 9 
 
   BA (8) Frontal primary motor cortex  
BA (4) 
Case 10   BA (11), 
(13) 
 Left temporal lobe 
Case 15    BA (8), (9), 
(46) 
 
Case 17   BA (47), 
(11), (13) 
 Left temporal lobe BA (44), (45) 
 
 
Case 19 
 
    Left frontal lobe lacuna infarcts. 
Case 20 
 
    Global atrophy and foci of high 
signal to frontal regions 
 
 
Table 1 shows the heterogeneous pattern of pathology of the 14 scanned patients. All 
patients showed clear evidence of pathology to frontal lobes except cases 2 and 6. 
Seven cases had pathology that encompassed frontal and temporal lobes. Case 8, who 
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had bilateral VMPFC pathology determined by CT scan, did not undergo MRI for the 
present study. 
 
Serial Reaction Time task 
As expected, controls showed speeded responses on sequence blocks and slower 
responses on the random blocks. Patients showed less of a rebound effect from the 
sequence block (S) to the last random block (R2) at test and a greater degree of 
variance in RT latencies overall (Fig. 1) 
 
 
[insert fig. 1 here] 
 
Two-way ANOVA of RT for the learning blocks (1-6) showed that controls 
responded more quickly than patients, F (1,38) = 8.74, p < .01, and that both groups 
sped up during this learning phase, F (5,34) = 3.20, p < .05. The interaction was not 
significant, F < 1. Patients’ sequence learning test scores differed from those of the 
controls, F (1,39) = 5.47, p < .05 with means showing greater learning in the control 
group (82.4, SD 41.1) than in the patient group (15.7, SD 120.7). Additional analyses 
conducted with ratio scores (sequence learning score divided by mean RT for random 
trials at test x 100%) showed that this group difference persisted even when overall 
differences in speed were taken into account, F (1,39) = 14.70, p < .001 (Table 2).  
 
A final analysis was conducted with data from a sub-group of eleven patients (cases 1, 
3-5, 7-10, 15, 17 and 19) with fronto-temporal pathology established by imaging data. 
One-way ANOVA showed that patients and matched controls had significantly 
different learning scores. This analysis shows a larger F value than for the total group 
analysis F (1,21) = 8.26, p < .01, consistent with suggestions that fronto-temporal 
structures mediate aspects of performance on this task (Peigneux et al, 1999).   
 
Controls had higher explicit measure scores than patients, F (1,39) = 4.36, p = .044. 
 16 
This difference may reflect impairments to the explicit system/processing in the 
patients. Thus patients’ impaired performance on the SRT task may be due to 
impairments in explicit learning ‘contamination’ rather than impairments in the 
implicit learning that the task was intended to measure. To establish whether explicit 
knowledge facilitated learning of the sequence, an ANCOVA was conducted for 
patient and control sequence learning scores with explicit scores entered as the 
covariate. Results showed no main effect of explicit scores on the dependent variable 
ratio scores, F < 1 but there was still a main effect of group, F (1,39) = 12.07, p < .01. 
One interpretation of these findings is that the patients are impaired on the explicit 
and implicit components of this task independently. An alternative explanation is that 
the apparent explicit deficit in the patient group represents demand effects that led to 
overestimated explicit knowledge in the control group. Question one informed 
participants that the circles appeared in a sequence and asked them to rate their 
awareness of the sequence. Controls might have been more concerned to perform the 
task ‘correctly’ than patients and thus rated their awareness more highly. 
 
Table 2: Performance of controls and head-injured patients on the SRT task: 
Sequence learning scores, combined random mean, ratio and explicit scores.  
  
 
 
Group Sequence 
learning 
score 
Mean of 
random blocks 
at test 
Sequence/random 
ratio 
 
Explicit 
Score 
Controls (n = 20) 
Mean 
SD 
 
82.4 
(41.1) 
 
464.0 
(123.6) 
 
17.8 % 
(8.4 %) 
 
11.0 
(3.1) 
Patients (n = 20) 
Mean 
SD 
 
 
15.7 
(120.7) 
 
787.2 
(474.3) 
 
5.6% 
(11.5 %) 
 
8.3 
(4.7) 
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Mere exposure effect task  
Mean preference priming scores (Table 3) were analysed non-parametrically because 
the ratings constituted ordinal data and exploratory data analysis showed the data to 
be somewhat skewed.  
 
Table 3: Preference scores of head-injured patients and controls on the mere exposure 
effect task. 
    
 
Preference Scores 
Group Target 
mean 
Foil 
mean 
Priming 
score 
Controls  
(n = 20) 
 
Mean 
SD 
 
 
 
 
26.7 
(4.2) 
 
 
 
23.2 
(2.6) 
 
 
 
3.5 
(3.2) 
Patients 
(n = 20)  
 
Mean 
SD 
 
 
 
 
24.3 
(4.0) 
 
 
 
22.6 
(4.7) 
 
 
 
1.7 
(5.0) 
 
Mann-Whitney U showed a significant difference between patient and control 
priming scores in the preference condition, z = -1.79, p < .05, with controls showing a 
larger priming effect. Separate analysis of target/foil ratings for patients and controls 
with Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test showed that ratings for targets and foils were 
significantly different for controls, z = -3.29, p < .001, but not for patients, z = -1.14 
ns, indicating that controls showed a mere exposure effect but the patient group did 
not.  
Hidden co-variation detection 
Data presented in Table 4 show that controls and patients responded more quickly to 
the primed co-variances (targets) at test than non-primed co-variances (foils).  
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Table 4: Hidden co-variation detection task: Mean RT values for targets and foils for 
controls and head-injured patients. 
 
Group  Targets Foils 
 
Difference 
Controls 
(n = 20) 
 
Mean 
SD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2785.0 
(1107.9) 
 
 
 
2993.7 
(1227.3) 
 
 
 
208.7 
(616.3) 
Patients 
(n = 20) 
 
Mean 
SD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4493.5 
(2029.2) 
 
 
 
4783.6 
(2797.0) 
 
 
 
290.1 
(2341.7) 
 
A repeated-measures ANOVA conducted for target and foil mean RT responses 
(within-subjects factor) and group and condition (between-subjects factors) showed a 
main effect of stimulus (targets or foils) on RT responses, F (1,36) = 9.50, p < .01. 
There was no main effect of co-variation type (long-kind / short-capable or short-kind 
/ long-capable presentations), F < 1 and no interaction for stimulus and co-variation 
type, F <1 suggesting that the observed priming reflected detection of the co-variation 
and not simply priming of stereotypes (e.g. capable people have short hair). There 
was no main effect of group, F (1,36) = 3.22, p = .08 but there was an interaction 
between group and stimulus, F (1,36) = 5.30, p < .05. To investigate the interaction 
for stimulus and group, patient and control data were analysed separately. A repeated-
measures ANOVA showed that reaction time responses to targets and foils were 
significantly different for controls, F (1,19) = 14.87, p < .001 but not for the patient 
group, F < 1. These results suggest that patients were not primed on this task. On the 
explicit measure, no participant reported that they had used hair length to guide their 
responses but instead reported that they focussed on ‘eyes and expression’. 
Automatic stereotype activation task 
Nineteen head-injured patients (one patient left the rehabilitation unit) and twenty 
controls completed the task. Controls completed fewer circles overall in the prime 
condition (M = 63.4, SD 16.5) than the neutral condition (M = 66.9, SD 16.5) 
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regardless of order. Patients also completed fewer circles overall in the prime 
condition (M = 41.3 SD 14.8) compared to the neutral condition (M = 46.8, SD 19.1). 
ANOVA confirmed the main effect of condition (prime or neutral) on speed (number 
of circles joined; F (1,35) = 7.63, p < .01) and a main effect of group (F (1,35) = 
17.75, p < .001), as controls were faster overall. There were significant interactions 
between condition and order F (1,35) = 24.99, p < .001 and condition x order x group 
F (1,35) = 4.69, p < .05. There was no significant interaction between condition and 
group (F< 1). Because of interaction effects and the control group being faster overall, 
we computed number of circles completed in each condition by order to establish 
whether patients showed an effect of the elderly prime (Table 5). Data showed that 
when the neutral condition came second, both groups sped up on the second circles 
task. When the prime condition came second, controls showed a (smaller) increase 
but the patient group did not speed up at all.  
 
Table 5: Mean scores of head-injured patients and controls on the motor task 
component of the ASA task by condition and order showing the mean increase in 
circles completed from first to second task. 
 
Group Prime 
1st 
Neutral 
2nd 
Increase 
1st –2nd 
Neutral 
1st 
Prime  
2nd 
Increase 
1st – 2nd 
Patients 
(n = 19) 
 
Mean 
SD 
 
 
 
39.7 
16.6 
 
 
 
49.5 
21.6 
 
 
 
9.8 
7.7 
 
 
 
43.7 
16.5 
 
 
 
43.0 
13.5 
 
 
 
-0.7 
6.7 
Controls 
(n = 20) 
 
Mean 
SD 
 
 
 
61.2 
17.9 
 
 
 
76.1 
16.9 
 
 
 
14.9 
14.7 
 
 
 
57.7 
10.0 
 
 
 
65.6 
15.7 
 
 
 
7.9 
7.9 
 
Analysis of the difference between number of circles completed in the neutral and 
prime conditions when the prime condition came second showed a significant group 
effect, t (1, 17) =  –2.56, p < .05. This finding indicates that the elderly prime had a 
greater effect on motor speed of patients, who failed to increase in speed as a result of 
practise when the prime circles task came second.  
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Responses for the funnelled debriefing questionnaire showed both groups had no 
explicit awareness of the elderly stereotype consistent with Bargh at al’s (1996) 
results. 
Effect size analysis 
Task data were analysed further to investigate whether performance dissociated 
across tasks dissociated and was associated with psychometric task scores. Patient 
data were transformed into standardised (z) scores for the three implicit tasks on 
which they showed impairments (SRT, MEE and HCD). Control group means and 
standard deviations served as the normative data (SRT learning score mean = 82.4, 
SD = 41.2; MEE preference priming mean = 3.5, SD = 3.2; HCD target-foil RT 
difference mean = 208.7, SD = 616.3). One-tailed significance was set to .05, with a z 
score lower than -1.64 constituting impaired performance on each implicit task. This 
analysis is likely to provide a conservative estimate of impaired performance because 
the large standard deviations of the control group made it less likely that patient 
scores would fall into the tail end of the distribution (Figure Two).  
 
[fig 2 about here]. 
 
We computed a measure of social function from the dysexecutive questionnaire 
(DEX) of the BADS (Wilson et al, 1996). DEX scores for Self and Other represent 
the patient’s ratings of their behavioural, cognitive and emotional problems and those 
of a significant other (spouse, sibling, carer). We subtracted Self from Other scores on 
the social and emotional questions alone to establish a DEX discrepancy score: the 
greater the value, the greater the difference between Self and Other ratings reflecting 
impaired awareness of socio-emotional problems and an increased likelihood of 
exhibiting socially aberrant behaviour.  
 
We made several hypotheses based on existing findings and the conceptual 
framework adopted for the study: H1 – implicit judgement and implicit performance 
are distinct and dissociable types of implicit cognition (Lieberman, 2000; Seger, 
1997); H2 – executive function is dissociable from implicit cognition (Barker et al, 
2004); H3 – executive function ability contributes to social behaviour; H4 - implicit 
cognition mediates non-verbal social cognition (Lieberman, 2000). 
 21 
 
Figure Two shows that performance across the three tasks dissociated at the level of 
individual cases. Some patients were impaired on the SRT (cases five and 11), MEE 
(cases six and 20) or HCD (cases 13 and 15) tasks alone, others were impaired on a 
combination of two tasks (cases four, eight, ten and 18), and one case was impaired 
on all three tasks (case 17). Based on Lieberman’s (2000) conceptualisation, we 
predicted that performance on the implicit judgment tasks would cluster together, 
however the data did not follow this pattern and only case 4 showed impaired 
performance on the MEE and HCD tasks and not the SRT task. Cases 8 and 10 
showed impaired MEE and SRT and case 18 impaired HCD and SRT. Thus our 
results do not support H1 that implicit performance and implicit judgement are distinct 
types of implicit cognition,  
 
On the basis of z scores, 11 patients showed impaired performance on the implicit 
cognitive tasks despite all patients showing impaired performance on at least one test 
of executive function. Thus, consistent with H2, implicit cognition appears to 
dissociate from executive function. However, this finding might reflect the lack of 
sensitivity of the particular implicit cognition tasks in detecting individual differences 
and the greater range of variability when comparing a patient score to the mean of the 
whole control group rather than matched age and IQ samples (although patients were 
matched to their own specific control for age and IQ for the group analyses), rather 
than a genuine dissociation. 
 
We compared individual scores on the psychometric measures with performance on 
the implicit tasks to establish whether there were any consistent patterns of deficits 
and sparing across the tasks for the two subgroups (as determined by effect-size 
analysis) ‘Impaired Implicit’ (II- Table 6) and ‘Non-Impaired Implicit’ (NII-Table 7).  
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Table 6: Range of scores on DEX, Implicit tasks, WAIS III, WMS-R, BADS, Hayling & Brixton, WCST for head-injured patients impaired on 
implicit tasks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*  Average 
**Borderline 
 
 
 
 
 Social 
Measure 
Implicit 
tasks 
WAIS III WMS-R BADS Hayling & Brixton WCST 
Patient DEX Task Full-
scale 
Visual 
Memory 
Attention Verbal 
Memory 
General 
Memory 
Rule 
Shift 
Action 
Program 
Zoo 
Map 
Key 
Search 
Temp 
Judgement 
Mod6 
Elements 
Hayling Brixton Total 
score 
11 30 SRT 
 
*Ave **Border High ave Ave Ave Ave Impaired Impaired Impaired High ave Impaired Impaired High ave No data 
5 11 SRT 
 
Low ave Impaired Ave Low ave Border Impaired High ave Impaired Impaired Impaired High ave Mod ave Ave Low ave 
8 23 SRT 
MEE 
Ave Impaired Low ave Low ave Impaired Impaired Ave Impaired Impaired Impaired Impaired Mod ave  Ave Ave 
10 13 SRT 
MEE 
Low ave Ave Ave Impaired Impaired Impaired Impaired Ave Impaired Impaired Impaired Mod ave Impaired Low ave 
18 -8 SRT 
HCD 
Low ave Impaired Ave Low ave Impaired High ave Impaired Impaired Impaired Impaired Impaired Impaired Impaired Border 
17 -8 ALL 
 
Low ave Impaired Ave Impaired Impaired Impaired Impaired Impaired High ave Impaired Impaired Impaired Impaired Low ave 
6 17 MEE 
 
High ave High ave Ave Ave Ave High ave High ave High ave High ave  High ave Impaired Ave High ave High ave 
20 1 MEE 
 
Ave Low ave Low ave Low ave Low ave High ave Ave Impaired Ave High ave High ave Poor Poor Ave 
4 2 MEE 
HCD 
Ave Low ave Low ave Low ave Low ave Ave High ave Impaired Ave Impaired Ave Poor Ave Ave 
13 2 HCD 
 
Ave Ave Low ave Ave Ave High ave High ave High ave Impaired Impaired High ave High ave High ave Border  
15 -7 HCD 
 
Low ave Ave Impaired Ave Ave Impaired High ave Impaired Impaired  High ave High ave Low ave Impaired Border 
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Table 7: Range of scores on DEX, Implicit tasks, WAIS III, WMS-R, BADS, Hayling & Brixton, WCST for head-injured patients not impaired 
on implicit task 
 
 
*  Average 
**Borderline 
 
 
1Case nine had experienced repeated testing as a result of a compensation claim that might explain his high memory scores
 Social 
Measure 
WAIS III WMS-R BADS Hayling & Brixton WCST 
Patient DEX Full-
scale 
Visual 
Memory 
Attention Verbal 
Memory 
General 
Memory 
Rule 
Shift 
Action 
Program 
Zoo 
Map 
Key 
Search 
Temp 
Judgement 
Mod6 
Elements 
Hayling Brixton Total 
score 
1 6 
 
Ave 
 
Low Ave Ave Low Ave Low Ave High Ave High Ave Impaired Ave Impaired High Ave Ave Mod Ave Ave 
2 -8 
 
 Ave Impaired Border Low Ave Border Ave High Ave Impaired High Ave Impaired Ave Impaired 
 
Ave Superior 
3 
 
28 
 
Superior Ave Superior Ave Ave Ave High Ave Ave Ave Impaired High Ave Mod Ave High Ave Low Ave 
7 7 
 
Ave Impaired Low Ave Ave Low Ave 
 
Impaired Ave Impaired Ave Impaired High Ave Ave Mod Ave Border 
19 0 
 
Ave Superior Superior High Ave 
 
Superior Ave High Ave Ave Ave Impaired Impaired Ave Ave Low Ave 
12 -13 
 
Ave Ave Superior Ave Ave High Ave Ave Impaired High Ave 
 
Impaired Impaired Ave Superior Superior 
14 2 
 
Ave Ave Ave Ave Ave Ave 
 
High Ave Impaired Impaired Impaired High Ave Mod Ave Low Ave Ave 
16 4 
 
Low Ave Low Ave Border Low Ave Low Ave High Ave 
 
Ave Impaired Impaired Impaired High Ave Impaired Ave Ave 
19 6 
 
Ave 
 
Ave Ave  Ave Ave High Ave High Ave Impaired Impaired Ave Ave Ave Low Ave Impaired 
The II group had greater deficits overall on the psychometric measures than the NII 
group, specifically regarding performance on Visual Memory and General Memory 
tests of the WMS-R and across the range of executive function tests with the 
exception of case 9 (see footnote 1, Table 7). However, scores for the two groups 
were not significantly different at the two-tailed level for Visual Memory, t (1,18) = 
1.65, p .11, and General Memory, t (1,18) = 1.60, p .12. In both groups, cases with 
high DEX discrepancy scores showed a greater degree of executive impairment than 
those with low DEX discrepancy scores. There were exceptions to this general trend: 
patients 16 (NII group) and 13 (II group) had a high number of impaired executive 
function scores with low DEX scores and inversely case three showed impairment on 
only one executive subtest but had a DEX discrepancy score of 28. In relation to H3, 
this pattern suggests that level of executive function impairment is often, but not 
necessarily, associated with social deficits as measured by the DEX discrepancy 
score. In the same way deficits on the implicit tasks were only partly associated with 
high DEX discrepancy scores. There was a non-significant tendency for higher DEX 
discrepancy scores in the II group (M = 6.91, SD = 12.9) than the NII group (M = 3.5, 
SD = 11.4; t(17) = 1.40, p = 0.09 one-tailed, (with case 3 omitted as explained in 
footnote 2). Thus the data provided only tentative support for H4 that implicit 
cognition mediates social function.  
 
To test whether executive function performance was associated with performance on 
the implicit cognitive tasks (H2) a correlation was conducted with BADS total score 
(the most comprehensive of our executive measures) and SRT z scores. We used 
scores on the SRT because this implicit measure seemed the most sensitive of all the 
implicit tasks and has been most widely used in the literature. The correlation 
between BADS and SRT was significant, r (20) = .66, p < .01 one-tailed. This 
apparent relationship between the process(es) that facilitated performance on both 
measures is not fully explained by extent of lesion, because SRT performance 
dissociated from other implicit tasks, so results are not easily interpreted as more 
extensive or severe pathology leading to greater implicit deficits. Thus, although the 
presence of executive function deficits in the NII group suggests that executive and 
implicit processes can dissociate, there is also evidence that implicit cognition and 
executive function are correlated across the whole group.  
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DISCUSSION 
Head-injured patients were impaired on three of four implicit cognitive tasks at the 
group level, but performed at least as well as controls on the elderly stereotype 
activation task. Additional analyses of individual scores on the mere exposure effect, 
hidden co-variation detection and SRT tasks showed dissociation across tasks, both 
within and between participants.  
 
Evidence of impaired implicit cognition, particularly in our fronto-temporal sub-
group, supports findings reported by Gomez-Beldarrain et al (1999; 2002) of impaired 
SRT task learning in their frontally injured group. The finding of fractionated 
performance on implicit tasks partially supports the notion, proposed by Seger (1997), 
that implicit cognition comprises dissociable systems. However the dissociable 
patterns of performance shown in the present study cut across Seger (1997) and 
Lieberman’s (2000) conceptual distinction of the different ‘types’ of implicit task.  
 
Present findings also contrast with studies showing intact implicit cognition in 
patients with head injury (Doyon et al, 1997). Despite evidence to the contrary, 
particularly from the Parkinson’s disease literature (Jackson et al, 1995), and more 
recently brain-injured patients (Gomez-Beldarrain et al, 1999; 2002), the notion that 
implicit processes are robust to pathology remains widely accepted. Reber (2002) 
recently commented that, 
 
“…the neurologically impaired show these [implicit learning] effects” (2002; pg. xiv).  
The findings of the present study challenge these assumptions and mandate the use of 
several implicit tasks before firm conclusions can be drawn about the implicit 
cognitive ability of particular populations. The results of each task are discussed 
separately below due to the dissociable performance across tasks. 
 
 SRT task 
The patient group was impaired on the SRT task relative to controls, even with 
baseline speed partialled out. This impairment could reflect visuo-spatial memory 
deficits (failure to remember the location of preceding stimuli would make it harder to 
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acquire the temporo-spatial associations between stimuli), temporal ordering deficits, 
or impairments in general attentional or executive processes (for example, error 
monitoring deficits). Impaired performance is unlikely to reflect impaired explicit 
learning of key/location contingencies since all participants completed a practice 
session on a ‘random’ block prior to the task proper, and training continued until they 
were comfortably familiar with key /location contingencies. Visual memory and a 
composite executive function score were the only cognitive functions associated with 
impaired SRT performance across an extensive range of psychometric measures. 
 
Five of the six patients with impaired SRT had visual memory impairments, falling 
within the very impaired range for four cases. However, cases two and seven had 
severe visual memory deficits yet intact SRT learning (Table 7). Impaired visual 
memory (as measured here) therefore might impact upon SRT task performance but is 
insufficient to fully explain performance deficits on this task.  
  
There is also little evidence that impaired ability to temporally code information 
provides an alternative explanation for the current findings. Recent research has 
shown that temporal representations are grounded in specific action systems and 
events (Shin and Ivry, 2002). Therefore encoding of temporal information of stimulus 
circles should have proceeded concurrently with sequence learning and the 
acquisition of key-location contingencies.  
 
Impaired higher level ‘executive’ processes such as attention, monitoring or control 
processes may have contributed to the patient group’s diminished sequence learning, 
either directly or by impairing explicit learning of the sequence. One possible 
interpretation of the current findings is that the patient group had explicit learning 
deficits and implicit cognition was intact allowing residual performance on this task. 
Explicit learning can aid performance on the SRT task (Boyd & Winstein, 2001). 
However this conclusion conflicts with studies showing no effect of dual tasks on 
SRT learning and intact learning in amnesics (Jiménéz & Méndez, (2001; Nissen et 
al, 1989). We found little evidence that explicit knowledge contributed to 
performance in our sample – controls had higher explicit scores than patients but 
explicit knowledge was not a significant covariate of sequence learning.  
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All the patients had executive deficits, and BADS total score correlated with SRT 
performance. However, current findings and frameworks provide little explanation for 
this relationship. The SRT task is generally considered to be relatively robust to 
attentional manipulations (Jiménéz & Méndez, 2001) and Willingham, Salidis and 
Gabrieli (2002) concluded that,  
 
“ SRTT learning is minimally affected by cognitive load” (2001, pg. 1458).   
 
Although there is some evidence that dual task conditions reduce learning on the SRT 
task (Curran & Keele, 1993), Keele, Ivry, Mahr, Hazeltine and Heuer (2003) argue 
that such conditions only affect performance when they trigger the operation of a 
multidimensional learning system. Multidimensional learning happens when the 
secondary task conflicts with the sequence learning task, for example when 
participants are responding to auditory tones and a visual sequence. If the secondary 
task maps closely onto the sequence learning task then a unidimensional learning 
system can encompass both tasks and there is no dual task decrement. According to 
this framework, pathological reductions in attention will not affect sequence learning 
because unidimensional learning systems are sufficient for completing the SRT task. 
This framework attenuates assumptions that SRT learning makes demand on control 
processes. Accordingly it is possible that some lower level process needed for SRT 
learning contributed to performance on the executive function tasks encompassed by 
the BADS, particularly since executive functions operate across other functions 
meaning that executive tasks, like implicit learning tasks, are seldom process pure.  
 
The Mere Exposure Effect task (MEE) 
 
In contrast to the control group, the patient group did not show a mere exposure 
effect. The effect size analysis revealed no notable similarities in performance across 
the psychometric measures for the two patients who were impaired on the MEE task 
alone (see Table 6).  
 
Two interpretations of the mere exposure effect may provide clues as to why the 
head-injured group failed to show a preference effect on this task. Whittlesea and 
 28 
Price (2001) proposed that the standard methods for eliciting mere exposure effects 
work because they induce a ‘global’ processing style where stimuli are encoded 
holistically. This global processing style facilitates holistic judgements such as 
preference ratings, but may hinder explicit recognition compared with a feature-based 
processing style. It is conceivable that patients failed to initiate a global processing 
style when requested to merely listen to the Finnish words. Unfortunately, because 
participants always completed the preference rating task before the recognition test, 
we do not have accurate recognition data to see whether poor performance on the 
preference condition accompanied better performance on the recognition condition, 
suggestive of the adoption of a feature-analysis strategy rather than global processing. 
We have no other evidence that patients approached this task with a different 
processing style to controls. It is worth noting that a global processing account has 
also been offered for hidden co-variation detection (Roßnagel, 2001), but there was 
no association in our data between impairments on the MEE task and impairments on 
the HCD task.  
 
One problem with the processing style account of the mere exposure effect is that it 
decouples affect from the phenomenon of conceptual fluency, reconfiguring the mere 
exposure effect as a purely cognitive phenomenon. In contrast, several researchers 
have emphasised the role of emotion to this task, attributing the mere exposure effect 
to an increase in processing fluency that always has a positive affective component 
(e.g., Zajonc, 1980). Given that our patient group varied in the degree of emotional 
change post-morbidly, the ‘affective’ hypothesis may have some explanatory power. 
However, the present study gives little insight into whether patients’ deficits on the 
mere exposure effect task reflect changes in processing style or in automatic affective 
evaluation. These are possible areas for future research.   
 
HCD task 
 
The control group responded significantly faster to primed co-variances than non-
primed co-variances at test; the patient group did not acquire the hidden co-variances.  
As with the MEE task, global processing has been proposed as conducive to hidden 
co-variation detection (Roßnagel, 2001). However, the dissociation observed here 
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between MEE and HCD performance is not wholly compatible with a global 
processing account of both tasks. Attentional deficits may have contributed to poor 
performance on the HCD task. The two cases (13 and 15) impaired solely on the HCD 
task had impaired Attention scores and borderline impaired WCST scores. In contrast, 
cases 3, 9 and 12 of the non-impaired implicit group (Table 7) had superior Attention 
scores and good HCD scores; case 12 had a WCST scores in the Very Superior range. 
It is therefore plausible that some attentional and/or executive function processes 
contributed to HCD performance on the present task, although it must be borne in 
mind that patients with satisfactory HCD scores also showed impaired Attention 
scores. None of the participants showed explicit knowledge of the co-variances, so it 
is possible that attentional or executive processes contributed directly to implicit 
knowledge acquisition when participants were required to attend to the faces and 
auditory descriptions. 
 
Automatic stereotype activation task 
 
Both groups completed fewer circles after prime compared to neutral sentences, 
replicating Bargh et al’s (1996) finding of a general slowing effect in response to the 
elderly prime. In contrast to their performance on the other implicit tasks, the patient 
group responded ‘normally’ on this task and showed a significantly stronger priming 
effect than the controls. Preserved performance on this task may be due to the task 
priming ‘chronic’ social knowledge structures, i.e. the elderly stereotype, rather than 
new information. At face value, it suggests that different measures of implicit 
cognition dissociate. Alternatively, the apparent preservation may be pathological, 
reflecting an inability in patients to inhibit automatically triggered responses or a 
greater susceptibility to the prime and its associate of ‘slowness’ that offset a general 
implicit cognitive deficit (Dijksterhuis, Aarts, Bargh, & van Knippenberg, 2000). 
Many of the head-injured patients commented during testing on the 
neuropsychological battery that they felt ‘slowed down’ at cognitive and physical 
levels since their head injury. The patient groups performance therefore, might 
indicate a greater affinity with the behavioural construct of ‘slowness’ primed by the 
stereotype rather than with the stereotype generally. Their performance also provides 
evidence of the capacity to acquire information presented explicitly even though the 
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associated behavioural trait is activated implicitly. Of the four implicit tasks in this 
study, the ASA task is arguably the most prone to contamination by explicit 
processing. It is the only task in which the study phase is self-paced, giving 
participants more opportunity to become aware of the critical information. The 
finding that patients showed ‘normal’ priming on this task, and no awareness of the 
prime, stands against a general interpretation that diminished ability across the other 
implicit tasks is due to impaired explicit processing. 
 
Future research might investigate whether priming effects are still seen after head 
injury with tasks that activate other constructs (e.g. speediness rather than slowness).  
 
Executive function, implicit cognition and behaviour 
 
Whilst the current study has little conclusive to offer in response to the question posed 
by French and Cleeremans (2002, pg. 1) “What is implicit learning for?,” our findings 
suggest possible areas for consideration. They are broadly consistent with 
Lieberman’s (2000) suggestion that implicit cognition underpins social behaviour, in 
that the patient group as a whole showed impaired implicit cognition and socio-
behavioural problems that varied in extent and severity. Those patients impaired on 
implicit cognitive tasks showed higher DEX discrepancy ratings than the non-
impaired implicit group, but there were exceptions in both groups that suggest no firm 
relationship between social deficits and implicit cognition. However, social and 
emotional behaviour were not comprehensively assessed in the present study, so the 
weakness of the observed relationship might reflect the limitations of the DEX 
discrepancy score in capturing social behavioural problems. It is also worth noting 
that patients with impaired implicit cognition and high DEX discrepancy scores also 
tended to have relatively poor executive function scores, although social behavioural 
problems and implicit cognitive deficits can co-occur without associated executive 
dysfunction (Barker et al, 2004) and vice versa as the non-impaired implicit group 
show (Table 7). Despite these inconsistencies our findings indicate, in general terms, 
that impaired social behaviour and executive and implicit deficits co-occur. The 
correlation between SRT task performance and the BADS total score suggests that 
implicit sequence learning and executive function tasks share some processing 
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demands. There may be some mileage in Lieberman’s (2000) suggestion that some 
elements of social behaviour are dependent on implicit processes.  
 
The co-occurrence of social, implicit and executive problems, and particularly the 
correlation between the SRT task and BADS, raises the question of whether implicit 
processes contribute directly to social behaviour, do so via a contribution to executive 
functions, or whether executive function is the key variable in social behaviour and 
implicit cognition. Another possibility is that performance deficits shown by the 
patient group on the implicit tasks represent impaired explicit processes. However 
when considered together our data are not supportive of this assumption. Both groups 
showed scant explicit knowledge of crucial stimuli across tasks even where the 
groups differed in this respect and patients performed comparable to controls on the 
ASA task where critical stimuli were explicitly presented and acquisition was self 
paced. The relationship shown here between composite score on an executive 
function measure and SRT learning score is not easily explained. Executive function 
research has focussed primarily on the function and capacity of these top-down 
processes and given little consideration to the possibility that disruption to lower level 
processes (the emphasis here is on underlying processes rather than measures - which 
are unlikely to be wholly process pure) could also impact upon performance on higher 
cognitive tasks (although see Miyake et al, 2000). Within the cognitive literature there 
has been a general focus on distinguishing between explicit and implicit processes, 
rather than asking, ‘how much of each?’ (Jacoby, 1991). Future research might 
examine the possible contribution of implicit cognition to social functioning by 
measuring specific elements of behaviour (reading of nonverbal signals, orchestrating 
of responses etc.) to test whether implicit processes contribute to these functions 
independently of an executive contribution, which might be limited to the monitoring 
and control of these elements.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Our findings challenge two common assumptions, that implicit cognition is resistant 
to head injury and that different tests of implicit cognition measure the same 
underlying variable. If there is indeed a general ‘implicit cognition’ component to 
performance on these tests, it may be only selectively recruited depending on task 
demands. Future studies should use several tests to ensure they capture it. 
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Footnote 2 
 
Case 3 was excluded from the comparison of the group with impaired implicit 
cognition versus the non-impaired group as his data have been presented elsewhere 
and showed impaired SRT task learning and lack of preference effect on the MEE 
when compared with age and IQ matched controls (Barker et al, 2004). In the current 
analysis, however, his data did not reach criterion for impairment although his SRT z 
score of -1.50 approached the impaired level. This is likely to reflect the greater 
variability in scores in this control group compared with the controls tested for his 
case study. 
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Figure 1: Serial Reaction Time task: Group means and mean standard errors at 
acquisition and test for head-injured patients and controls.  
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Fig. 2: Z scores of head-injured patients on the serial reaction time, mere exposure 
effect and hidden co-variation tasks (patients with no impairment, i.e., z scores ≥ 
-1.64 on all three tasks, are shown in grey) 
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